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Abstract and Keywords
The book’s Introduction reflects on precisely what we understand by decolonization and 
considers its relevance in light of the more recent and growing interest in global history, 
as well as the history of globalization. The Introduction explains how the history of 
decolonization is being rethought as a result of the rise of the ‘new’ imperial history, and 
this history’s emphasis on race, gender and culture. It also discusses the more recent 
growth of interest in the histories of globalization and transnational history, as well as in 
the histories of migration and diaspora, humanitarianism and development, and human 
rights.
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Over the past century, the collapse of formal colonial control, the end of empires—or, as 
specialists usually term it, decolonization—has reshaped the world’s political geography. 
The ideological impact of decolonization on the ways regimes, governments, and social 
movements justify their behaviour has been equally profound. In much of the global 
South, rejecting colonialism was the necessary precursor to the creation of new nation-
states, new ideological attachments, and new political alignments. For some, not least in 
francophone Africa, that rejection did not necessarily produce support for decolonization 
but, rather, for alternate claims to political inclusion, social entitlements, and cultural 
respect, all aspirations thought to be achievable within, rather than beyond, the 
structures of empire. For many others, though, anti-colonialism necessarily demanded a 
fuller decolonization—of politics, of economies, and of minds. These more radical and 
rejectionist stances fuelled equally profound social transformations, placing the end of 
empires within a spectrum of revolutionary change.
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Decolonization also occasioned many of the longest, bitterest wars of the twentieth 
century. These conflicts were often hard fought. Violence was not, however, confined to 
armed struggles or their colonial synonym, ‘emergencies’. From symbolic acts of protest 
to persistent low-level insurgency, the threat as much as the actuality of violence shaped 
decisions about how and when colonial rule should cease. A contested process, at times 
pursued in the absence of forums for peaceful dialogue, decolonization catalysed differing 
styles of resistance, mass demonstration, and guerrilla warfare. Resistance, in turn, 
provoked imperial experimentation in counter-insurgency, repressive legislation, and the 
mass displacement of civilian populations. Counter-revolutionary in intent, these actions 
sometimes had social consequences as far-reaching as the original uprisings they sought 
to crush. Even the most highly orchestrated colonial withdrawals were rarely entirely 
peaceful. Partitions and, conversely, enforced territorial unifications could be especially 
bloody, leaving damaging legacies of unresolved argument and trauma, which split out 
over subsequent decades. Decolonization, then, could prefigure outpourings of retributive 
violence against those who were marginalized or, still worse, judged as collaborators by a 
country’s new rulers.
Moreover, the end of twentieth-century empires—European and Asiatic—marked the 
biggest and most concentrated process of state-making (and empire un-making) the world 
has seen: prevailing ideas about sovereignty, citizenship, and collective and individual 
rights were all reconstituted as a result. The end of empire promoted different ideas of 
belonging, whether to nation, to ethnicity, or to ideals. New types of social activism were 
stimulated, as were innovative forms of international and transnational cooperation, 
enabling colonial peoples to eject colonial overseers who, with only rare exceptions, 
enjoyed greater access to military power. In whatever way they are described, the 
movements and events explored in this Handbook stand alongside the twentieth-century’s 
world wars, the Cold War, and the longer arc of globalization as one of the four great 
determinants of geopolitical change in living memory.
So how might we best characterize decolonization as a global phenomenon? This 
Introduction and, more broadly, this collection of essays, offers some new answers to 
some very long-standing historiographical questions. Contributors demonstrate how the 
end of empire was embedded in the geopolitics of the second half of the twentieth 
century: the lasting effects of the Second World War, the impact of the Cold War, and new 
and accelerating forms of globalization. Together and separately, these geopolitical forces 
reacted with the unfinished business of decolonization; each, in their different ways, 
affected, altered, or accelerated the others.
The Second World War refashioned global politics beyond the Asian and European 
heartlands from which the major combatants entered hostilities in 1937, 1939, or 1941, 
just as the Cold War inflected the politics of decolonization. Pause, for instance, to 
consider the reconfiguration of territorial boundaries, the new human rights agendas, 
and the profound changes in international political economy that emerged in the wake of 
the two World Wars. Or reflect on the spread of colonial ‘proxy wars’, as Cold War 
animosities hardened. Whichever the example, we are reminded that the end of empires 
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was, to some degree, contingent on the development of other geopolitical factors. Hence, 
decolonization has to be understood as, at once, a ‘post-World War’ phenomenon as well 
as a process that gathered momentum in the long Cold War cycle running from the 1940s 
to the early 1990s.  Different phases might be identified within that broad fifty-year 
spectrum, depending on which ideological struggle or whose rights and entitlements 
predominated, or how practices of statecraft and public diplomacy changed as 
international organizations and international laws proliferated.
For all that, decolonization was as much a catalyst to global change as an outcome of it. 
The political contestations, cultural clashes, and violent confrontations intrinsic to ending 
empire reverberated far beyond their immediate locale. Examples of successful 
contestation were a source of inspiration for communities elsewhere facing equivalent 
forms of political discrimination, social exclusion, or rights denial.  The underlying 
concerns that animated anti-colonial opposition were as pressing in South Africa as they 
were in North Vietnam. Methods of political mobilization, techniques of evasion, and 
styles of propaganda and mass communication practised in one place were emulated in 
others. The practices of civil rights movements in the United States, whether non-violent 
and ecumenical or radically internationalist, resonated especially strongly.  A rhetoric of 
anti-colonial solidarity bore fruit, often articulated in stirring terms of affinities of the 
oppressed, of pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, non-alignment, or Third Worldism. That 
rhetoric also inspired groups and individuals to action and altered the terms on which the 
public diplomacy of empire was conducted.  Often operating outside the law and with 
limited material resources to hand, opponents of empire exploited their moral resources 
instead. Appealing for global support on ethical grounds, they demanded an end to 
discriminatory legal regimes. They highlighted the maltreatment of colonial subjects and 
posited a world without the racial discrimination at colonialism’s core.  Put differently, 
the moral disarmament of imperialism became the weapon of choice for those anti-
colonialists without the means to end empire militarily.
Less theorized than its cousins imperialism and colonialism, decolonization is widely 
framed as a relatively discrete process.  Yet, as several chapters in this volume reveal, 
decolonization’s conceptual and chronological boundaries have long been, and remain, 
decidedly fuzzy.  One thing that unites recent if somewhat diffuse scholarship on the ‘end 
of empire’ is the tendency to increase its geographical and temporal span. The concept of 
decolonization is, in other words, now applied more widely and over a longer period than 
was the case for early political and scholarly practitioners of the term. Indeed, whereas 
past scholarship once presented decolonization as neatly packaged and 
compartmentalized by empire, region, and period, we broaden decolonization’s 
conceptual, geographical, and temporal boundaries in ways that force us to rethink what 
decolonization actually was.
In theorizing decolonization, we highlight the following challenges: the prior requirement 
to determine whose empires are in question; the difficulty in establishing when or if 
decolonization was ever completed; and the need to work out whether decolonization as 
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factors.  Together these theoretical challenges sit at the heart of this Handbook, and the 
rest of this Introduction explains how we have sought to tackle them, and to what 
interpretive effect. Our ambition—building on revisionist scholarship on decolonization—
is to provide a new analytical framework, the purpose of which is not simply to explain 
when and why decolonization happened, but how it happened and, as importantly, with 
what results.
Let us start with the term ‘empire’. Established disciplinary distinctions, such as that 
between oceanic empires and territorially contiguous empires, tend to cloud the issue of 
whose decolonization is under scrutiny. Historian Tony Hopkins, for one, suggests that 
any definition of decolonization must encompass the informal empires of western 
economic influence in Latin America, East Asia, and elsewhere, alongside America’s 
previous and current overseas engagements and China’s escape from the shackles of 
extra-territoriality.  Hence, the Handbook adopts a pluralistic understanding of the term 
‘empire’, encompassing a variety of types of rule, and all of the above categorizations.
Another problem, of first principles, appears deceptively simple: when did empires end? 
Decades of scholarship on modernization, dependency, ‘neo-colonialism,’ ‘failed state’ 
architectures, and post-colonial conflict make plain that answers cannot be reduced to a 
watershed moment of ‘flag independence’ or, in Swahili, uhuru wa bendera: the point at 
which external colonial rule nominally ended.  State-centric explanations clearly fall 
down insofar as they equate the withdrawal of colonial authority with the ‘end of empire’. 
Deeper economic changes are overlooked, as is the replication of colonial forms of 
authority within nominally independent countries.
Rejecting the idea of ‘flag independence’ as a decisive break point, this Handbook 
reframes the idea of decolonization—less as a sequence of events and more as a globally 
connected process. The approach adopted is to tackle decolonization afresh, explaining 
not just when, but how, why, and, importantly, if ever empires came to an end. In short, 
how is the history of decolonization to be rethought as a result of decisive methodological 
shifts, which have begun to emerge in the scholarship of the last decade or so?. Imperial 
histories have long placed issues of race, gender, and culture at the heart of their 
analysis. Newer is the striking growth of interest in global history, histories of 
globalization, and transnational history, as well as histories of migration and diaspora, 
humanitarianism, development, and human rights—all of which challenge us to think 
more broadly still about the dynamics of decolonization.
Tracing decolonization’s global span reveals how the achievement of independence 
catalysed different ideas of statehood, galvanizing bold, if sometimes transient, 
experiments in social, racial, and gender equality, and sharpening popular identification 
within and between nations and communities undergoing similar struggles for freedom. 
Some of the ideas involved here were locally specific, even unique, but many more were 
shared, borrowed, or adapted among the peoples caught up in fights for basic rights, for 
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dialectic at work here, it is that globalization conditioned decolonization, just as 
decolonization shaped globalization.
It should thus come as no surprise that the interplay between decolonization and 
globalization looms large in our thinking. Globalization remains perhaps the biggest 
intellectual challenge facing the humanities and social sciences today.  Yet its champions 
and critics are invariably concerned with the present, with crudely exponential 
assumptions about the pace and scale of scientific and technological change built into 
globalization’s teleology. These assumptions seemingly ignore the fact that much of our 
global past was forged in the crucible of the world’s empires, which were nothing less 
than giant systems for organizing mobility of all kinds—of people, goods, and capital—on 
an international scale. If differing colonial experiences intersected, then decolonization is 
surely better understood within a global, rather than nation-empire, framework of 
analysis.
Indeed, a central argument recurring throughout the chapters in this Handbook is that 
decolonization was actively globalizing. It was a motivating force that triggered all sorts 
of changes ranging from global geopolitics and new trans-regional alignments to major 
migratory movements and bitter culture wars over the legacies of empire. The 
implications of this line of argument are significant. If decolonization was truly 
globalizing in its effects, then it becomes difficult to treat the end of a particular empire 
or the demise of a single colony in isolation. Explaining the globalizing effects of the end 
of empires requires us to take more seriously the question of inter-relatedness. It means 
that we need to consider how local colonial conflicts connected with wider causes, 
whether narrowly political or more broadly ideological, as well as with more longstanding 
shifts in the movement of people, ideas, and goods: in other words, with globalization. 
Reduced to its simplest terms, it is surely no coincidence that the Oceanic and land 
empires constructed over centuries by Asia and Europe’s leading imperial powers 
disintegrated in relatively short order, and more or less together over the past century or 
so.
We suggest that we need to address four basic themes to demonstrate how and why 
decolonization exerted such a strong globalizing pull:
1. Historicizing decolonization, not as some inevitable and long foreseen outcome, 
but as something more open-ended, multi-layered, and contingent—neither entirely 
pre-figured nor substantially pre-determined, but a composite set of processes 
persisting well beyond formal transfers of power.
2. Exploring how decolonization’s gathering momentum globalized the Cold War. 
Colonialism, its discriminations, and its rights denials were issues of more tangible 
concern to greater numbers of people than the Cold War’s ideological divides. The 
contention here is that the resultant struggles to bring colonialism to an end 
transformed the nature and extent of the Cold War. We argue that decolonization 
catalysed changes in international alignments, in transnational networks, and in the 
13
14
Rethinking Decolonization: A New Research Agenda for the Twenty-First 
Century
Page 6 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 September 2018
intersections between the Cold War and anti-colonial attachments. As a result, 
decolonization registered as much across nations, empires, and international 
boundaries as it did within them.
3. Analyzing the relationship between decolonization and globalization to explain 
why so many empires ended in so short a space of time, revealing that the 
possibilities of globalization—of an interconnected world of mobility and movement—
assured the supporters of decolonization greater access to essential resources, to 
wider networks of influence, and to a global audience.
4. Recognizing that violent contestation was also integral to the decolonization 
process. Whether in full-blown warfare within, between, or across states, or in 
insurgent attacks and the security force repression that these invited, or in the 
undeclared civil wars within colonial societies on the threshold of imperial collapse, 
the violence of decolonization was acutely asymmetric. So prevalent was this 
asymmetry that it might be judged fundamental to the nature of decolonization. We 
reach this conclusion because the asymmetry of colonial conflicts registered most 
strongly in the violence done to non-combatants: for the most part, colonial subjects 
unrecognized in law or practice as ‘civilians’.
Historicizing Decolonization
Historicizing decolonization means resisting the temptation to read history backwards, 
starting from the known endpoint of empire in order to assemble the causal factors that 
inexorably brought about colonial collapse.  The interpretational dangers of doing so are 
clear. The complexity of colonial politics is flattened into a misleading story of supporters 
and opponents of empire—of opposing extremes. Moderates of all stripes disappear from 
the narrative. Alternatives to decolonization are ignored. The prosaic realities of day-to-
day colonial life are hidden; so, too, is the sense of contingency in people’s political 
choices. Within European nations, the banal acceptance of empire, or at least of some 
form of dependent relationship between richer and poorer societies, may also be 
overlooked or misunderstood. The pitfalls are many: colonial histories and local 
specificities are obscured, and other trajectories out of empire are not taken seriously as 
subjects of inquiry.
Decolonization was neither ineluctable nor unavoidable. Rather, it was an outcome 
actively politicked over in terms of rival claims, many of which did not posit the complete 
rupture of imperial attachments. Social histories of popular politics in late-colonial 
societies offer a powerful rejoinder to reductive accounts of communities either ‘for’ or 
‘against’ decolonization: they make plain that abstract concepts like ‘nationalism’ and 
‘anti-colonialism’ fail to capture the diverse views and the differing motives of those 
involved. Anti-colonial ‘nationalist mobilization’ was rarely as total or as clearly 
identifiable at the time as it might appear in retrospect.  Instead, individuals’ claims 
15
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expressed economic, political, or cultural demands that were not predicated on the 
achievement of national independence, sovereign rights, or self-determination.
New scholarship on self-determination illustrates this contingency powerfully. For 
example, Brad Simpson suggests that human rights histories have made two erroneous 
arguments concerning the concept itself. First is that anticolonial movements used the 
discourse of self-determination instrumentally, primarily to achieve broader goals, such as 
economic development and racial equality. Second, that by the 1960s, self-
determination’s fiercest advocates in the Global South had reduced the principle-cum-
right ‘to the receipt of statehood and perpetual non-intervention thereafter,’ diluting its 
liberal, democratic implications. Simpson contends that both arguments oversimplify the 
ways in which a variety of state and non-state actors deployed self-determination claims 
to envision sovereignty and human rights in the era of decolonization. Rather, self-
determination is better understood as a form of claim making about the nature and scope 
of post-colonial rights and sovereignty—an open-ended, rather than a fixed, concept.
Framed in this subtler light, decolonization begins to look more contested than 
inexorable, more historically contingent than preordained.
In order to understand what decolonization is, we need to lay bare the various processes 
involved. Together these processes were to question the legitimacy of an entrenched 
order of empires and to pave the way for a new order of nation-states to take its place. 
But this rethinking of decolonization as a composite concept is complicated by the fact 
that we still lack historical distance from the events in question. Just like a mooring rope, 
the further we have travelled from the era of decolonization the more we have felt its 
pull. To better connect the effects of the ends of empire to the making of our 
contemporary world, eschewing the polemics which continue to surround this subject, we 
need to reframe decolonization not as one process but as a bundle of processes, 
encompassing ‘post-colonialism,’ ‘second wave decolonization,’ ‘re-colonization,’ and ‘de-
colonialization.’ These processes transcended the experiences of individual colonial 
powers and colonies; and they predated and outlived formal transfers of power.
Chronology is equally important here. To think through decolonization as a composite 
concept, it is necessary to analyse the end of empires as passing through a series of 
interlocking phases: an initial delegitimizing of colonialism; the resultant contestations 
over the persistence, the reform, or the termination of external colonial control; and the 
very imperfect transitions to sovereign independence for former dependencies that 
followed. Set within this chronological framework, ‘post-colonialism,’ ‘second wave 
decolonization,’ ‘re-colonization,’ and ‘de-colonialization’ provide a basis for rethinking 
decolonization by bringing into considerably sharper analytical focus the multiple 
trajectories and the different timelines upon which the end of empire occurred. Critically, 
each of these processes was accelerated, but still far from complete at the moment of 
independence: collectively they point towards the conclusion that decolonization was not 
simply as a dramatic geopolitical shift that occurred in the mid-twentieth century, but 
17
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something that has subsequently cast such a very long shadow over our contemporary 
world.
‘Post-colonialism’ or, perhaps more accurately ‘post-empire,’ is taken here not to highlight 
discursive forms of representation and resistance, important as they are, but in a more 
literal sense to mark out a formative and highly transitional period in the history of 
international relations, one in which governments, businesses, transnational movements, 
aid agencies, and other international organizations were seeking to protect their interests 
and preserve their influence through and beyond the moment of independence. All sorts 
of calculations, intrinsic to the end of empire, had to be made by those who sought to 
navigate their way across this late-colonial and post-colonial divide. Some adapted to new 
realities more readily than others. Just as colonialist attitudes and colonial practices did 
not end abruptly, nor on the other side of the scale did anti-colonialism disappear as 
former dependencies achieved nationhood, or ‘flag independence’. Empire, after all, had 
been a pervasive, almost ubiquitous, form of political organization for centuries. Its 
effects were bound to linger, whether in material terms of economic dependency, political 
clientage, and NGO activity, in patterns of migration between imperial metropoles and 
erstwhile dependencies, or in subtler ties of language, culture, and outlook. Furthermore, 
as Christopher Lee makes plain in his chapter contribution, anti-colonialism, too, would 
subsist as a prevailing way of thinking for many. ‘Post-empire’ was not a moment in time: 
rather it is better understood as the passage of time, marked by the dismantling of an old 
colonial order, the birth of a new post-colonial order, and the protracted and sometimes 
painful adjustments that led from the one to the other.
After wresting formal control of their states from Europe’s colonial powers, national 
liberation movements also sought to exert more practical forms of control over what the 
institutions of those states actually did. On the eve of Ghana’s independence, Kwame 
Nkrumah declared that ‘we must show that it is possible for Africans to rule themselves.’ 
A prescient warning, for the premise for ‘second wave decolonization’ is that 
independence was often highly circumscribed. The incompleteness of formal 
decolonization and the lasting consequences of colonial dependency for African and Asian 
people’s belief in their capacity to govern their affairs are well captured by the Nigerian 
novelist Chinua Achebe. Gaining worldwide attention for his first novel Things Fall Apart
(1958), Achebe spoke of a ‘postcolonial disposition’ whereby ‘a people who have lost the 
habit of ruling themselves’ had difficulty running the new systems ‘foisted upon them at 
the dawn of independence.’ During the 1960s and 1970s, the meaning of decolonization 
thus shifted away from the acquisition of legal sovereignty and towards the struggle over 
the apparatus of government that would make that sovereignty real. The extension of 
state ownership in former colonies, for example, often reflected attempts by ruling 
parties and regimes to match their political dominance with tangible control over national 
assets. From the nationalization of major industries within former colonial territories to 
the efforts made by Middle Eastern, African, and Asian export producers to build a new 
international economic order that served their interests above those of the western 
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world, decolonization played out in fundamental changes to the political economy of 
newly independent states and the terms on which trade with the nations of the Global 
South should be conducted.
Resistance to ‘re-colonization’ by post-colonial states took many forms. In his chapter, 
Joseph Hodge illustrates that, between the 1930s and the 1970s, the emergence of 
‘development’ as both a guiding principle and an administrative practice of empire 
triggered numerous responses among colonial communities to escape its clutches. Such 
resistance did not end with formal independence. Quite the reverse: post-colonial states 
were equally inventive in asserting their rights to determine how development, now 
typically re-designated as overseas ‘aid’, should be transacted. Efforts to diversify sources 
of development and reduce reliance on any one donor or provider were one response, as 
was the formation, in short order, of a spate of non-western branches of international 
organizations. In order to increase their lobbying power, some of these branches grouped 
themselves into regional conferences—most notably, the Arab Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies of the Middle East. In these—and other—ways the international 
humanitarian arena became a key site of emerging power engagement in what had 
traditionally been western power discussions.
To borrow the phrase of the Zimbabwean writer Chenjerai Hove, the driver behind ‘de-
colonialization’—a concept rooted in the psychological dimensions of colonial rule—was 
nothing less than ‘a cleansing of the colonial languages.’ School curricula in numerous 
post-colonial societies were rewritten to accommodate regime eagerness to revitalize 
vernacular language teaching, to teach ‘authentic’ national histories, or to promote a 
particular ideological worldview. Arabization programmes, commonplace in North Africa 
and the Middle East, became identifiable, not just with the restoration of Arabic language 
use in schools and administrative services, but with the promotion of pan-Arab solidarity 
and opposition to Israel’s territorial gains in the aftermath of 1967’s Six Day War.  ‘De-
colonial’ cleansing of this type was equally evident in the realm of international law. 
Although the initial spark for the revision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions came from 
humanitarian and human rights activists, the force that propelled the negotiations that 
led up to the Additional Protocols was post-colonial, specifically, a radical reframing of 
the very idea of ‘international armed conflict’ to incorporate the wars of liberation 
movements at a time when the majority of those movements had already succeeded in 
their independence quest. In that sense, the Additional Protocols were a retrospective 
proclamation of the justice and legitimacy of the anti-colonial cause.
To reiterate, the more expansive definition of decolonization we have been applying—
framed as a composite concept spanning successive phases—points to a single conclusion
—one that pervades this collection of essays. Narrowly political definitions of 
decolonization as ‘a surrender of external political sovereignty,’ ‘the transfer of power 
from empire to nation-state,’ or, more vaguely, ‘the taking of measures by indigenous 
peoples and/or their white overlords intended eventually to end external control over 
overseas colonial territories,’ simply won’t do.  Each definition, in its insufficiency, 
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formal transfer of power with the ‘end of empire’. Each overlooks deeper economic 
changes, as well as the replications of colonial forms of authority, juridical practice, land 
rights, property ownership, and commercial transaction in post-colonial societies.
These points bring us full circle to the question of when, and if, at all, twentieth-century 
empires came to an end. It is, in certain circles, fashionable to argue that empires and 
imperialist practices somehow persist through rich world interventions in fragile states 
and developing world crisis zones. This type of analysis rests on two premises. One is that 
the chosen sites, the motivations, and the practices of contemporary European military 
interventions in Africa and Western Asia are intimately connected to the imperial pasts of 
Europe’s former colonial powers. The other is that understandings of political violence 
and state legitimacy are embedded in decolonization experiences. Western models of 
good governance predominate as indicators of how regimes should operate, how 
governments should reach decisions, and how communities should order their political 
lives.
The persistence of quasi- or neo-colonial influences beyond independence was—and is—a 
widely discussed phenomenon, not least in the midst of twenty-first century wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The view that humanitarian and human rights interventions 
exercise power over the very people they seek to emancipate is increasingly familiar. 
What many of its proponents fail to grasp, however, is that assertions of Western power 
since the collapse of colonial rule are as likely to have been multi-lateral as bi-lateral. 
State aid may have become a pawn of Cold War politics, but multi-lateral aid has hardly 
been agenda-free either. The intervention of international agencies in post-colonial 
conflicts has raised growing concerns about what Nkrumah and others saw as the control 
of local policies from outside. Hence the idea of ‘re-colonization’—the replication of 
western forms of authority via non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. 
What has fuelled such fears are the western origins and orientation of many of these 
organizations, including their continued reliance on the United States and Western 
Europe for much of their funding.
If narrowly political concepts of decolonization are analytically too limiting, the phrase 
‘end of empires,’ by contrast, opens the door to different historical timelines, which set 
colonial withdrawals and conventional ‘transfers of power’ alongside the murkier, often 
muted, effects of decolonization within formerly colonized societies and its lasting 
legacies within Europe itself. Sensitivity to transnational currents of change need not and 
should not deny space for national stories of ends of empire: this collection contains 
several such surveys. Equally, the decolonization phenomenon was something bigger and 
more complex than the experiences of any single imperial power and its dependencies. 
Hence, as Gary Wilder suggests, we might profitably look beyond ‘methodological 
nationalism—the assumption that the national state is the primary unit of historical 
analysis and the privileged explanatory matrix for historical phenomena.’ Applying this 
thinking to experiences of empire in the francophone world, he concludes that
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… starting with the empire as an analytic category is not the same as studying 
French national actors in the many places they happen to be …. It follows that the 
crucial question is not how France behaved overseas or how its subject 
populations experienced colonial rule, but how the fact of empire, including ways 
that colonial subjects reflected upon it, invites us to rethink, or to unthink, France 
itself as well as the global imperial order within which it has been embedded.
Wilder’s point is well made and might be applied to all of the modern empires studied in 
this collection. To illustrate the point, stop for a moment to consider decolonization’s 
trajectories in two very different empires, one—the Japanese—a relatively transient 
phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the other—the Ottoman
—of a much longer, multi-century duration. Beginning in Taiwan, Japan’s imperial 
conquests gathered momentum from the 1890s onwards. By the time that Japan seized 
Manchukou, a large swathe of northern Chinese territory, in 1932, East Asia’s eventual 
escape from foreign imperial control and the global conflict that would help bring out this 
liberation were coming into view. Japanese efforts to carve out its newest colonial state, 
to demarcate it administratively, and to reshape it culturally, were thus bound up with a 
larger war of conquest in mainland China. This conflict would also seal the fate of the 
Japanese empire as a whole.  The Japanese path from imperial conquest through 
political and cultural implantation to enforced decolonization combined peculiar rapidity 
with vast social devastation.  Thomas David Dubois captures this dynamic, commenting 
that ‘in contrast to the long century of British high imperialism, the entire history of 
Manchukuo is thus one of urgency, grandiose planning, and bold execution.’
If Japan’s experience of empire-building and forced decolonization were highly 
compacted, the fate of a much older imperial system—the Ottoman Empire—reminds us, 
following Wilder’s insight, that Turkey’s relationship with its colonial territories and its 
exposure to external imperial pressures might be usefully rethought. Let Alan Mikhail 
and Christine M. Philliou be our guides here:
Cleaving the questions of longevity and violent demise into two demonstrates the 
difficulty, indeed near impossibility, of weaving together the early modern empire 
with the presumptive modern one. The brokers who proved so crucial to the long-
term survival of the empire from the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries 
were precisely the ones who were pushed out of the system when the reforms we 
associate with ‘modernization’ and ‘westernization’ were instituted in the 
nineteenth century. And yet we are only beginning to understand in all their 
complexities the final tests of diversity, crisis, and change that buried the empire 
in the twentieth century.
The Ottoman Empire was not only much older than the Japanese Empire, it was also more 
of a hybrid. It was both land-based and maritime, both indirectly ruled and directly 
colonized. In some regions Ottoman administrators felt isolated and exposed. Other parts 
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homeland.  This hybrid quality helps explain why trying to fit Ottoman imperial history 
within a linear account of rise and fall is an analytical dead end.
The examples of Meiji Japan and late Ottoman Turkey illustrate the tension experienced 
by rapidly modernizing nation-states that were, at the same time, blocking demands for 
statehood within their colonial dependencies. The collapse of each empire following 
defeat in war triggered wider transformations throughout South East and Western Asia. 
The fate of the Japanese and Ottoman Empires thus suggest that the bigger questions still 
hanging over decolonization are not why it happened, but with what consequences—in 
these two particular cases how decolonization’s broader transregional consequences
played out. In seeking answers to these ‘why,’ ‘how,’ and ‘with what consequence,’ 
questionswe are compelled to explore the connections between the global (or macro) 
forces of change and their more localized (or micro) dynamics.
Cold War and Decolonization: Globalizing Anti-
Colonial Conflict
In the second half of the twentieth century, the local impulses behind decolonization 
conflicts from French Vietnam to Portuguese Angola were interwoven with the 
geopolitical contest between rival Cold War blocs. Yet, the political divides involved were 
really two sides of the same ideological coin, the basic dynamic being a clash of opposing 
worldviews about how societies—and particular ethnic groups or social classes within 
them—should be organized and ordered in relation to one another. With notable 
exceptions among settler-based rebellions in Palestine and Rhodesia, or among the pan-
Hellenic supporters of the Greek Cypriot underground nationalist movement (EOKA) 
dedicated to ending British colonial rule in Cyprus, numerous anti-colonialists were 
drawn to the egalitarian message of the Communist bloc. Within the Communist ‘second 
world’, in turn, multiple civil society groups, educational institutions, and workplace 
associations proclaimed international solidarity with anti-colonial struggles.  From 
Vietnam to Angola, contests that pitched the United States and its Western allies against 
leftist anti-colonial insurgents attracted the strongest interest—and the greatest material 
aid—of all.  It is therefore surprising that decolonization was for many years treated by 
some Cold War scholars as incidental to the dominant plot of superpower opposition. 
Numerous historians now recognize that the end of empires was the central concern for 
many populations in the global South as well as within the Communist world itself. For 
many, opposing colonial injustice was a more potent agent of change than the ideological 
abstractions and geopolitical competition of Cold War.
For all that, the temptation in international history has been to privilege the disruptive 
impact of Cold War. That interpretative line is gradually changing with new and more 
nuanced perspectives on the nature and extent of Cold War–decolonization interactions.





Rethinking Decolonization: A New Research Agenda for the Twenty-First 
Century
Page 13 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 September 2018
the Cold War for decolonization remains difficult. It could, for instance, be argued that 
while the Cold War shaped the course and consequences of some colonial conflicts, it was 
ephemeral in others. Equally, it is now more readily acknowledged that multiple-state and 
non-state actors on both sides of the Iron Curtain, whether in the ‘First World’ of the rich 
West or the ‘Second World’ of the Communist bloc, played an important part in slowing or 
accelerating imperial collapse. Among the latter might be counted a host of revolutionary 
actors, all of which offered greater dynamism, unbending commitment, and more 
responsiveness to the needs of their revolutionary anti-colonial clients. At state level, one 
might include the Yugoslavs, other non-aligned states, and, first and foremost, the 
Cubans. At non-state level, one thinks of a host of solidarity groups and fund-raising 
organizations that lent support, both moral and material, to anti-colonial struggles in 
Africa and Asia.
The essential question asked in light of this is whether Cold War pressures were driving 
processes of decolonization, or vice versa. Our conclusion is that the end of empires 
precipitated fundamental shifts in the way the Cold War was conceived and fought, 
through regional proxies in particular. Put simply, the collapse of empires sucked in Cold 
War rivals to pre-existing colonial conflicts of much older vintage. While the Cold War was 
increasingly global in reach, decolonization was more actively globalizing. East-West 
alignments and ideological divisions never mapped exactly onto the North-South conflicts 
that heralded the disintegration of empires. These disintegrations were sometimes 
falteringly slow (e.g., think of Portugal’s long-lasting African attachments for instance), 
sometimes shockingly abrupt (recall the chaotic early months of the Congo crisis). But 
the essential point is that contested decolonization both antedated and outlasted the Cold 
War.
The constant background noise of imperial collapse was something to which the major 
Cold War rivals had to adjust. For example, Washington policy makers in the late 1940s 
fretted that a strategy of pure containment was far too negative to draw Asian peoples 
away from Communism’s growing appeal. They turned instead to a more positive model: 
an ‘imaginary of integration.’ Cultural barriers between peoples would be broken down 
once it became apparent that ordinary Americans sympathetically identified with a world 
emerging from colonialism. The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism, to 
discard any association with the language and attitudes of imperialism, and to bring 
about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia increasingly 
informed American diplomatic rhetoric after 1945. Some of Asia’s leaders were 
meanwhile giving voice to an altogether different vision of their region’s future. As North 
Vietnamese troops neared victory over the French garrison besieged at Dien Bien Phu in 
spring 1954, China and India reached a settlement governing relations over Chinese-
occupied Tibet. At the same time, the two Asian giants elaborated the ‘five 
principles’ (pancheela) by which their relations should proceed: each was to respect the 
other’s territorial integrity; non-interference in the internal affairs of the other would also 
be upheld; non-aggression was made a formal objective; relations were to proceed on an 
equitable basis; and the fifth and ultimate goal was summarized as peaceful coexistence. 
Western observers, inclined to dismiss the five principles as vague and utopian, missed 
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the point—according to Matthew Jones, ‘it was the pancheela, perhaps more than any 
other statement at this time, that best represented the philosophical gulf between an 
“Asian” perspective on resolving outstanding issues between newly independent states 
and the fears of a bipolar division of the region into rival military blocs that the South 
East Asian treaty Organization (SEATO) was helping to excite.’
The divide, as much philosophical as ideological, between the Cold War mindsets of the 
Western and Eastern bloc on the one hand, and the emergent nonalignment of the global 
South on the other, was underlined a few months later when the so-called Colombo 
Powers, many of them newly independent nations, convened at Bogor in Indonesia in 
December 1954. A larger conference of Asian and African states was announced for the 
spring of the following year.  Bandung was the result.
The significance of the 1955 Bandung Conference, of course, was never reducible to its 
overt challenge to Cold War thinking.  Of greater importance was Bandung’s symbolic 
affirmation of a new-style Third World politics, which highlighted the primary relevance 
of colonial discrimination, racism, and poverty for millions of people throughout the 
global South.  Decolonization, in other words, was more than the foremost diplomatic 
concern of the Third World’s leading international actors. Underlying that preoccupation 
was the determination to expose the basic injustice of colonialism to the world. Yet, the 
Bandung vision was never dogmatically anti-Western—it was more inclusive and 
optimistic than that. The presence of two former imperialist nations—Japan and Turkey—
among the Bandung delegations underscored the idea that post-empire futures could, and 
should, be brighter than their colonial antecedents.
Bandung expressed through summitry a profound and popularly based shift in 
international and race relations that crystallized in the mid-1950s. This shift, while most 
apparent in Asia, was also global in scope, connecting African-American civil rights 
activism and radical pan-Africanism with the embrace of anti-colonialism by the 
governments and peoples of Soviet-occupied Europe. Framed in this global, transnational 
setting, Bandung might be usefully connected with other epochal events of its time: the 
Hungarian uprising of October 1956; Egypt’s successful defiance of Anglo-French-Israeli 
invasion a month later; Ghana’s path-finding independence in March; and the Little Rock 
civil rights protests in September 1957. Each, in different yet complementary ways, 
brought to the surface the underlying connections between Cold War rivalries, race 
discrimination, and pressures for decolonization.  In Jason Parkerwords,
…[t]he ‘Suez-Ghana-Little Rock’ time line noted above inaugurated what might be 
called the liberation phase of the Cold War, during which the dynamics of the 
superpower conflict served to advance rather than hinder progress on Race issues 
… in much of the Third World, liberation replaced repression because the 
ideological freeze of the latter thawed between a pair of burning contradictions. 
One, civil rights agitation in the United States began to quicken, undermining the 
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Cold War concern. Two, even ‘progressive’ colonial administration, understood as 
a gradual devolution of European authority, became increasingly untenable as the 
Third World asserted the right of self-rule sooner rather than later.
The late 1950s were indeed a key transitional point, even if it is tempting to argue that 
the ‘liberation phase’ ushered in during these years was as much the product of 
decolonization’s globalizing effects as of fundamental changes in the dynamics of the 
Cold War.
Transnational connections were a striking manifestation of decolonization’s global 
dynamic. The ideas and experiences of imperial rulers on the one hand and colonial 
peoples on the other reacted with one another. Multiple transnational networks resulted
—between officials and technocratic ‘experts,’ between social scientific theorists and 
medical practitioners, and, most famously, between anti-colonialist lobbyists, writers, and 
fighters. Decolonization, then, was an histoire croisée, a complex history of inter-
connection in which comparison between the actions and experiences of differing colonial 
communities and those who claimed to rule them was deeply embedded.
As Abin Chakraborty has put it recently,
…[w]hether it is the proliferation of Pan-African discourses on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the dissemination of Rastafarian culture, Che Guevara’s revolutionary 
struggles in Latin America and Africa, the G[h]adar movement of California and its 
role in the Indian nationalist movement, Subhash Chandra Bose’s international 
networks and the formation of the Indian National Army or the role of various 
Asian and African diasporic communities in nationalist struggles—all point to a 
persistently present transnational dimension in decolonizing processes.
For Che Guevara, speaking at the Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples 
of Africa, Asia, and Latin America held in Havana in 1966, the Vietnamese struggle 
against French and American imperialism epitomized ‘a transnational ideal of post-
colonial liberation based on a vision of proletarian internationalism.’ Che’s comments, 
redolent of the 1960s new leftism that he personified, also point to a more recent 
historiographical trend, namely, the attempt to explain decolonization from the anti-
colonial, or insurgent, perspective. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the Bengali 
playwright Utpal Dutt should devote his 1960s play Invincible Vietnam to what he saw as 
the emblematic struggle of contested decolonization.
Bengal also shared longstanding bonds of solidarity with Vietnam. Bengalis and 
Vietnamese experienced catastrophic and colonially induced wartime famines during the 
1940s. Various trade unions and political parties in Bengal observed Indochina Day on 25 
October 1945 in opposition to the British decision to send Indian soldiers to assist Dutch 
and French colonial troops in restoring European colonial authority in Southeast Asia. 
Two years later, the all-India Students’ Federation celebrated a Vietnam Day on 21 
January 1947 in combination with other student associations. This time, police moved in 
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Senate Hall and killing two students—Sukhendu Bikash Nath and Dheer Ramian Sen.
Bengali solidarity with Vietnam peaked during the late 1960s as American intervention 
heightened the impression of unbending Western imperialist resolve to stifle Third 
Worldist demands for freedom.  Here was transnational connection embedded in 
internationalist sentiment, in popular protest, and in cultural performance.
Decolonization and Globalization
Over the last decade, historians have paid considerably more attention to the relationship 
between empire and globalization.  Neatly summarizing their continuing efforts to 
reconceptualize imperial histories as entangled, global processes, Durba Ghosh makes 
the connection explicit. He argues that the imperial/global turn in historical writing 
presumes that empires were a product of global history as much as a just a driver of it, 
and that modern empires were a consequence of global capitalism rather than a project 
specific to the colonizers.
Decolonization has been largely absent from this story, however. Tony Hopkins has 
recently argued that a profound shift in the character of globalization brought the age of 
great territorial empires to an end.  But if the globalization backlash of the interwar era 
of the twentieth century was subsequently followed by a period of ‘post-war re-
globalization’ (or ‘post-colonial globalization’), the overall dynamics of that transition 
remain rather opaque, as does the more specific contribution of the end of empire to the 
process. Part of the reason for what may otherwise seem a surprising neglect of 
decolonization’s role in the new forms of globalization to emerge after 1945 may be 
sought in the underlying rationale for this Handbook: namely, that a much larger view of 
decolonization is required in order to relate this historic change to other major 
geopolitical forces of the last century. In just the same way as globalization may have 
shaken up old bordered imaginations to be replaced by new narratives of interconnection, 
so decolonization now needs to shake up our understanding of what it has meant to move 
from an old imperial world to one of (ostensibly) new nation-states.
Another difficulty is that the relationship between decolonization and globalization 
becomes distorted when economics is taken as its main proxy. Viewed economically, the 
globalization of the second half of the twentieth century is pushed back in time. The 
results of trade liberalization in the decades after 1945 were, after all, profoundly 
disappointing. In the wake of decolonization, a raft of state-led, import-substituting 
industrialization across Asia, Africa, and Latin America resulted in much of the 
developing world becoming more closed, not more open, to international trade.  The 
periphery shut the door just as the richer countries gradually opened up their trade 
regimes. So much is true. A more capacious view of decolonization, which, among other 
things, embraces the humanitarian, human rights, and development agendas that 
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such profound consequences for thinking about economic systems, social norms, and 
racial relations, suggests that new and accelerating forms of globalization were already 
well underway by the 1960s.
In the chapters that follow, we observe decolonization becoming entangled with 
globalization along three major axes.
First, we should not ignore the fact that colonial rule is widely regarded as an obstacle to 
globalization that had to be removed. Many, if by no means all, theorists of contemporary 
globalization see the nation-state as one of its key agents. They believe closer 
international integration to have largely been a product of the interplay of different 
national politics and state-led initiatives. Their unspoken assumption is that a society’s 
freedom to make its way in the global marketplace is contingent upon its prior ability to 
gain and assert its independence.  The act of giving political expression to nationalist 
sentiments, and thereby resisting foreign dominance, is taken to have been a necessary 
precursor to post-war re-globalization, regardless of the state of economic dependence 
that may then have persisted between the developed and developing worlds.
Other commentators on contemporary globalization lean to the view that the influence of 
state is retreating in the face of an array of supranational forces. Understood in this way, 
decolonization was a geopolitical phenomenon that was, in a very real sense, propelled by 
globalization—our second axis. Newly imagined forms of integration that emerged after 
the Second World War were premised on a less-stratified view of social relations. 
Globalization dismantled imperial systems of rule and displaced the racial hierarchies 
that had helped sustain them.  New discourses of humanity emerged as the end of 
empire offered Europeans opportunities for global engagement rather than a retreat from 
it. Together, a post-war generation of (mostly Western) NGOs, many built upon 
connections forged by European empires, sought to forge denser networks between 
peoples across the world and to expand the knowledge within Western societies of the 
suffering and plight of those living in the Global South. Their apparently relentless 
expansion, in turn, triggered concerns about their ‘banal,’ ‘petty,’ ‘mobile,’ or ‘sovereign’ 
power—anxieties that were later to give rise to alternative critiques of global power 
relations, and meanwhile threatened to drain humanitarian, human rights, and 
development agendas of what moral purpose they had once had.
These two axes of thought about the relationship between decolonization and 
globalization, the one pitching colonial rule as the obstacle to be removed by 
decolonization, the other casting decolonization as a geopolitical phenomenon driven by 
global changes, need not, however, be pitted as rival or antithetical interpretations. 
Yearnings for sovereignty were, after all, never simply about secession: they were also 
about new ways of thinking about belonging—of belonging to a different kind of world 
order, with different norms and rules. Hence, declarations of independence were almost 
always also, and perhaps equally, declarations of interdependence: they signified claims 
to be recognized by something wider.  This is precisely where the increasing prominence 
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such an important role. These actors served a critical function in post-colonial transitions, 
helping to make new sovereignties recognized and more recognizable, while 
simultaneously holding those fledgling sovereignties to account.
We can go further therefore to conceptualize decolonization itself as a globalizing process
—our third axis.  To explain decolonization’s globalizing capacity we need to be clear 
about the factors involved, which include capital and commodity flows, voluntary and 
involuntary migrations, and ideas exchanged, cultural practices emulated, and ideologies 
adopted. Whatever one reads into the term ‘global’, it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that forces of global change—tangible and intangible—were instrumental in the end of 
empires. Is it enough, then, to acknowledge a ‘global decolonization,’ much as scholars 
have reframed the Cold War in similar terms—less as a binary ideological conflict than as 
a global contest substantially played out in the poorest regions of the world? States, 
peoples, movements, and groups spanning multiple continents were caught up in 
empires’ endgames. Millions of lives were changed by it. The end of empires certainly 
catalysed new transnational allegiances and innovative forms of transregional resistance 
to foreign authority. To take but one example, in their writing for its newspaper, el 
Moujhahid, the publicists of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale increasingly 
appealed not just to fellow nationalists at home, but to potential sympathizers overseas in 
like-minded movements, in friendly neighbor-states, or among United Nations delegations 
and NGO lobby groups. Anti-colonialism, in other words, was in many cases articulated 
transnationally in a cosmopolitan language of rights.
So much is true. Yet, we are not arguing simply that decolonization should be analysed 
globally. Intrinsic to our use of the term ‘globalizing’ is the contention that decolonization 
was about something more than the mere deconstruction of colonial relationships. 
Rather, decolonization actively reconfigured the distribution of wealth and power within 
and between societies, altered long-established patterns of international relations, and 
gave rise to new forms of cultural interaction. The cumulative insights of this Handbook’s 
chapters confirm the conclusion that decolonization a motive force that triggered all sorts 
of changes, some of which were social and cultural, others political and economic, still 
others ideational and ethical. This larger view of decolonization sees the end of empires 
as a geopolitical force just as profound as globalization, and not merely a function of it.
Decolonization, we argue, had a complex relationship to the new forms of integration that 
emerged after the Second World War. Whether understood as a prior condition to 
globalization, as a phenomenon propelled by globalization, or as a globalizing force in its 
own right, decolonization profoundly shaped the contemporary world. In particular, 
rethinking the relationship between decolonization and globalization reveals something 
about the very nature of globalization itself. Anchoring the ‘re-globalization’ that took 
shape after 1945 amidst the geopolitics of decolonization exposes some of its underlying 
tensions. For example, by highlighting the wider geographical ramifications of local 
decolonization struggles we can better grasp the regional diversity of globalizing forces. 
These forces never emanated solely from within—nor were they simply a product of—the 
West, however much the literature often suggests otherwise. Perhaps, above all, 
48
49
Rethinking Decolonization: A New Research Agenda for the Twenty-First 
Century
Page 19 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 September 2018
decolonization lends context to the grievances of those left behind by an era of deepening 
interconnectedness and interdependency while at the same time revealing those enriched 
by it, as exemplified by the contestation over the New International Economic Order of 
the 1960s and 1970s and, equally, by new forms of uncertainty arising from enhanced 
contact and increased mobility between the Global North and South.
Decolonization, Violence, and the Colonial 
Subject
Decolonization is a story of inequality, asymmetry—and violence. To understand that 
violence, tone must first grasp how organized opposition changed through, and as a 
result of, decolonization. Decolonization’s violence was central to the pasts—and later the 
memories—of colonial populations; it was much less so to the lives of metropolitan 
Europeans. Although some of the violence involved—its escalation and its targeting—was 
entirely predictable, much of it took imperial governments struggling to reassert their 
authority by surprise. Local populations bore the brunt of their governments’ knee-jerk 
reactions. Disaggregating the levels of violence further, within local populations, 
particular communities suffered especially badly. Sometimes this stemmed from their 
religious or ideological affiliation, whether real or alleged; similarly, the identity politics 
of ethnicity and culture fed cycles of violence and reprisal. Crucially, unarmed colonial 
subjects, whose ‘civilian status’ was never recognized in domestic or international law, 
typically suffered more from the violence of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies than 
the warring parties who sought to exercise authority over them.
The extremely young and the extremely old were perhaps inevitably the most vulnerable, 
especially when decolonization triggered famine, forced removal of resident populations, 
or hyperinflation and the consequent unaffordability of essential goods. Other forms of 
collective violence, some clandestine and deniable, some highly public and 
demonstrative, targeted alleged supporters of one side or the other. Such performative 
violence was intended to intimidate and deter. Its principal victims were typically those 
unfortunate enough to find themselves on a physical, cultural, or ideological frontline. 
Women’s domestic workloads and their primary roles in child rearing and field labouring 
left them exposed to the predations of insurgents and security forces alike. Younger men 
and women, including adolescents, figured prominently among the militias, ‘self defence 
units,’ and other paramilitary auxiliaries employed by security forces and insurgents to 
conduct some of the most visceral, face-to-face violence. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
very young also figured among the principal victims of such violence.
Decolonization is all-too readily viewed as a binary, adversarial contest between imperial 
security forces and their anti-colonial opponents. Arguments tend to centre on how late 
colonial counter-insurgencies were fought. Such analysis can divert attention from what 
was locally particular, and from the dynamics of decolonization’s violence within and 
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between communities, rather than between rulers and ruled. Few would disagree that 
‘everyday violence’ was intrinsic to colonialism. But recognizing the casualness of that 
violence, whether physical or psychological, and its repetitious banality, is critical to 
understanding why certain groups among colonial subject populations—women, workers, 
and the young—were particularly exposed to it.
A key dynamic was the ruthless determination of insurgents and counter-insurgents alike 
to impose their social control over civilian populations by whatever means they deemed 
necessary. Several chapters in this collection show a link between levels of insecurity and 
the intensity of violence, with many of those involved in acts of violence operating with 
minimal constraint or state direction. Late-colonial violence, in other words, was 
increasingly privatized; it was either delegated to, or actively seized upon, by groups 
within particular communities to advance or protect their particular interests. Violent 
acts often catalysed cycles of retribution that widened the circle of those caught up in 
decolonization conflicts.
Politicians, administrators, and military commanders responsible for devising and 
implementing imperial policies either misunderstood or chose to ignore the particularities 
of the popular opposition they faced. Macro-level explanations were instead 
superimposed upon (and therefore obscured) the micro-dynamics of political contestation. 
Regional officials and imperial governments misconstrued local demands for basic rights 
as portents or symptoms of broader pressure for statehood. As a result, numerous 
colonial governments passed up opportunities for dialogue, convinced that force majeure
was required to suppress dissent. Even those in countries drawn to democratic 
universalism struggled with the proposition that their particular national brand of 
colonialism was less an instrument of social progress than a barrier to it.
Underlying this inclination to repress was a crucial fact: there was no recognized juridical 
category of ‘colonial civilian’ conferring guaranteed protections by the state. Quite the 
reverse: the non-combatant majority populations within colonial societies were 
reconfigured as ‘objects of military necessity,’ treated by those carrying arms as objects 
to be exploited. Value was attached to non-combatants for the goods they possessed or 
the labour they might provide, for the shelter or support they might offer, and for the 
information they might divulge.  The legally unrecognized status of colonial ‘civilian’ 
inevitably draws attention to the matter of rights denied, fought for, and won. In a very 
real sense, colonized populations were doubly rendered as subjects—not only subjected 
under law to a second-class status next to their imperial master, but also subjected to the 
demands of state security forces and other non-state armed groups in their midst. 
Confronted with violence in ways that armed personnel were not, these colonial subjects 
required and sought protection from the state and its opponents—they looked to various 
local or supranational protectors, from insurgent movements and loyalist militias to NGOs 
and other interested parties within the international community, to provide it.
50
Rethinking Decolonization: A New Research Agenda for the Twenty-First 
Century
Page 21 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 12 September 2018
Violence, then, is a key variable, at once a driver of decolonization and a locally 
transformative experience for particular communities and groups. Asymmetry is, of 
course, widely invoked to explain the processes of contestation integral to decolonization, 
but invoked how? Often the argument runs thus: Europe’s imperial giants gradually lost 
political control because superior military equipment and training proved insufficient in 
the face of the disillusionment with protracted colonial wars that set in among their home 
publics. Whereas colonial populations were necessarily bound up with the conflicts being 
fought out around them, Europeans rarely were. For many colonial subjects facing 
unending discrimination, it appeared that colonialism could only end violently. European 
publics, meanwhile, were increasingly being told that violence was incidental to a process 
depicted as globally inexorable and to a decolonization that was coming regardless.
May we take this point further? Does the idea of asymmetry help explain the end of 
empires? Plenty of foreign wars, old and new, have been fought with minimal public 
engagement ‘at home.’ We are, after all, living through a supposed ‘war on terror’ and, as 
we write, the extensive media coverage of the atrocities perpetrated by the followers of 
Islamic State has failed to galvanize European support for renewed interventionism in the 
Middle East. Wars of decolonization likewise signified a reversion to European type, a 
throwback to the so-called ‘small wars’ of the long nineteenth century, rather than a 
continuation of the total conflict model established by the two World Wars. Ultimately, 
these were conflicts about adjustable interests, but not vital ones. Even those depicted by 
their supporters as struggles for survival turned out otherwise. Yes, settler societies faced 
a loss of privileged status, frequently the prospect of dispossession, even eviction. But, 
no, the imperial states themselves were not existentially threatened by their loss of 
empire. Indeed, many quickly devised new narratives of ‘planned’ decolonization and 
‘transfers of power’ to affirm so.
Notice here the distinction between state and regime. Whereas governments or, in 
Portugal’s case, even regimes might collapse under the weight of discredited colonial 
wars, the societies they claimed to represent did not. Violence was more remote and 
ultimately less impactful within the metropolitan societies in whose name it was 
conducted. As the 1950s wore on, residual cultural presumptions of an imperial ‘right to 
rule’ corroded. Imperial governance, once depicted as the surest route to the 
modernization of colonial society, was increasingly recast as the essential barrier to it. 
Post-war Western Europe’s rising prosperity and the commensurate turn to consumerism 
played its part. So, too, did more critical media attention and the more pervasive ethical 
qualms about empire in general. Emergent youth cultures, the decline of social 
deference, and the consequent egalitarian shift in cultural thinking all helped break the 
multi-generational cycle of what one might call reflex imperialism—something that was 
more a habit of mind than a conscious political choice.
Thus, we have to take account of two interlocking processes in contested decolonization: 
on the one hand, the centrality of violence to the end of empires and, on the other, the 
acute exposure of unarmed and non-combatant colonial subjects to its impacts. 
Appreciating what decolonization felt like, viscerally, in terms of day-by-day exposure to 
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insecurity and fear, and to repression and violence, means looking more closely at the 
unarmed, unrecognized civilians who had no choice but to live through it, and whose lives 
were permanently scarred by it.
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Conclusion
This introductory essay has explained why this Handbook is based on a broad chronology 
and why it adopts an explicitly comparative focus. The plural in our title, ‘end of empires,’ 
is, in other words, significant. It reminds us that decolonization has deeper historical 
roots than are often acknowledged, requiring coverage of later nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century imperial change, and sensitivity to decolonization’s multiple variants. 
Empire endings were anything but synchronous. At the same time, this Handbook allows 
us to trace comparable processes within, and between, the different empires—European 
and non-European. Authors combine geographically framed treatments of decolonization, 
whether national or regional, with particular historiographical themes relating to major 
economic, social, cultural, and political questions of the post-war era. Together, their 
contributions demonstrate decolonization’s transformative effects, locally, nationally, and 
globally.
With the aftershocks of decolonization very much in mind, this Handbook also revisits the 
historical legacies and collective memories of empire. By doing so, the final section, in 
particular, compels us to rethink how the forces unleashed by decolonization continue to 
resonate today. Rather than returning to somewhat clichéd arguments over American or 
other contemporary ‘empires,’ the collection’s final section traces several of the more 
tangible legacies of decolonization. Five stand out. One is the lasting shifts in global 
patterns of migration whose origins lie in the late-colonial period but whose 
consequences played out over subsequent decades. A second is decolonization’s abiding 
cultural impact, as various forms of art, performance, and literature wrestled with the 
disappointments and frustrations of colonial independence as well as marking its actual 
achievement. A third is the continuing arguments over the recognition of, apologies for, 
and possible reparation in response to past colonial misdeeds, many of which were 
committed within the ambit of counter-insurgency campaigns fought at the end of empire. 
Fourth is the consequential evidence of the colonial inheritance of twenty-first century 
development policy and practice, even if the implications of that inheritance are 
somewhat more complex than hitherto allowed. Finally, and most obviously, are the 
remaining colonial territories, the yet-to-be-decolonized lands, that pepper the globe, 
often with troubled presents as well as pasts.
These complex, and at times even contradictory, imperial legacies point to a broader 
conclusion: that decolonization not only remains unfinished but is perhaps indefinite. It is 
something likely to stay with us for decades to come. Far from being a geopolitical 
phenomenon that we can safely consign to the past, it remains strikingly relevant, with 
multiple consequences reverberating through the contemporary world. Dissecting the 
end of empires—their timelines, their histories, and their unfolding consequences—is 
intrinsic to unraveling the process of decolonization itself. What this Handbook shows is 
that decolonization was not a singular process, but a set of processes that decades later 
are still unfolding. Like its partner globalization, decolonization is therefore 
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phenomenologically different from the twentieth century’s other major catalysts of global 
change: the two World Wars, the economic crisis of the interwar years, and the bipolar 
Cold War. Each of these, while leaving lasting legacies, may nonetheless be largely 
consigned to the past. Not so with decolonization. The end of empires is a phenomenon of 
the twenty-first, as well as the twentieth, century. As such, this Handbook calls for a new 
research agenda which fundamentally rethinks decolonization, with a view to unravelling 
why it mattered so much at the time and why it still matters so much today. The aim of 
this agenda should be to enable not only the academy, but also government and a wider 
public sphere to understand how many of today’s global challenges were once activated, 
and continue to be animated, by a far-reaching reconstruction of the international order, 
the effects of which have persisted way beyond the struggles for independence that now 
lie half a century or more in the past.
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